

Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00984 01 OF 04 201217Z

43

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AID-20 MC-02 DRC-01 AF-10

EUR-25 OMB-01 SAB-01 EB-11 SCI-06 FEA-02 /204 W

----- 101829

R 201114Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1572

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 4 TEL AVIV 0984

E O 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 6, 1973, MEETING WITH
US JEWISH INTELLECTUALS

1. SUMMARY: YEDIOT AHARONOT FEB 15 CARRIED SUMMARY OF
REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO SECRETARY AT DEC 6, 1973, MEETING WITH US
JEWISH INTELLECTUALS. YEDIOT AHARONOT VERSION WAS ABOUT TWO
THIRDS LONGER THAN THAT APPEARING IN FEB 9 WASHINGTON POST.
ISRAELIS PARTICULARLY HAVE NOTICED SECRETARY'S ALLEGED COMMENT
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GOI TO ENTER PEACE SETTLEMENT
AS LONG AS ARABS CONTINUED TO FEAR ISRAELI STRENGHT AND HIS REPORTED
EXPRESSION OF DOUBT AS TO FUTURE US CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
FOR ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM EMB TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE
ENTITLED "KISSINGER: ISRAEL MUST REACH SETTLEMENT WHILE ARABS
STILL FEAR HER" BY SHLOMO NAKDIMON. WE HAVE COMPARED THE
ARTICLE WITH VERSION D SCRIBED IN FEB 9, 1974 WASHINGTON POST,
AND DELETED DUPLICATIONS.

2. BEGIN EXCERPTS. LATELY , DR KISSINGER HAS HAD CLOSED
MEETINGS WITH DIFFERENT GROUPS OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE US.
A FULL REPORT OF ONE OF THOSE MEETINGS HAS FALLEN INTO THE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00984 01 OF 04 201217Z

HANDS OF THE UNDERSIGNED. IT IS NOT A TRANSCRIPT TAKEN

WHILE DR KISSINGER SPOKE BUT WAS RECONSTRUCTED LATER FROM NOTES TAKEN DURING HIS SPEECH.

3. EVERYBODY, INCLUDING DR KISSINGER, AND ALSO THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES, ASSUMED (BEFORE THE OCT WAR) THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT AT ALL URGENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DO ANYTHING, BECAUSE THE ARABS WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO FORCE ANY ACTION.

4. WHEN THE WAR BROKE OUT, THE ASSUMPTION OF DR KISSINGER AND OF AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERTS WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD WIN WITHIN THREE OR FOUR DAYS. NO SUPPLY OPERATION FOR ISRAEL WAS THEREFORE PLANNED. THE ISRAELIS ALSO BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD WIN SOON. ONE OF THE REASONS WHY IT TOOK SO LONG FOR THE DISPATCH OF AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS AND ARMS TO ISRAEL TO BE ORGANIZED, WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT ASKED FOR IT IN TIME, THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD NEED SUCH AMPLE SUPPLIES.

5. WHEN THE URGENT DEMAND FOR AMMUNITION AROSE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT INTERNAL PRESSURE ON THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY TO GET THE AIRLIFT MOVING AND ON THE PORTUGUESE GOVT FOR MIDWAY LANDING RIGHTS (AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIANS FLEW THEIR AIRLIFT OVER NATO COUNTRIES WITHOUT ANYBODY INTERFERING).

6. THE FACT THAT THE ARABS WERE CAPABLE OF FIGHTING FOR 17 DAYS WITHOUT THEIR ARMIES BREAKING DOWN WAS CONSIDERED AS A VICTORY FOR THEM, AND INDEED THEY MUST BE REGARDED AS THE ONES WHO WON THE WAR. THE ARMS THE ARABS HAD, AND PARTICULARLY THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTITANK MISSILES, HAD PUT 400 ISRAELI TANKS AND 70 ISRAELI AIRCRAFT OUT OF ACTION IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR. ISRAEL'S STOCK OF AMMUNITION HAD RUN OUT. AIRCRAFT THAT RETURNED FROM BOMBING MISSIONS WITHOUT HAVING DROPPED ALL THEIR BOMBS WERE FORCED TO LAND WITH THE BOMBS (NORMALLY, THEY ARE DROPPED IN THE SEA BEFORE LANDING) IN SPITE OF THE DANGER, SO GREAT WAS THE SHORTAGE.

7. THE ARABS MIGHT HAVE ACHIEVED MORE BUT FOR THEIR
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00984 01 OF 04 201217Z

MISTAKES. THEY SENT THEIR TANKS INTO ATTACK OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF THEIR MISSILE SYSTEM. THUS THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE COULD HIT THEM AS IN 1967. THE ARAB ARMIES SHOULD HAVE ADVANCED MORE SLOWLY AND ONLY AFTER BRINGING THEIR ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEMS FORWARD. HENRY KISSINGER SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED THE ISRAELIS FROM THE BEGINNING THAT AT THE MOMENT WHEN SUCCESS WOULD TURN THEIR WAY, THE UN WOULD ORDER A CEASEFIRE. THEREFORE, THEIR STRATEGY

SHOULD HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS -
ACHIEVING MAXIMUM RESULTS BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00984 02 OF 04 201442Z

43

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AID-20 MC-02 DRC-01 AF-10

EUR-25 OMB-01 SAB-01 EB-11 FEA-02 SCI-06 /204 W

----- 103407

R 201114Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1573

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 4 TEL AVIV 0984

8. BEFORE HIS FLIGHT TO MOSCOW -- DR KISSINGER REVEALED --
HE SENT ISRAEL A MESSAGE THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
COME TO TEL AVIV ON HIS WAY BACK ONLY IF HE WAS PROMISED
THAT ISRAEL WOULD RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, BUT WHEN HE ARRIVED
IN LONDON, HE WAS TOLD BY THE BRITISH THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS.
HE CONTACTED THE SOVIET AMB AND WARNED HIM THAT THE
USSR WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE ARABS STOP VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT.

9. HE ASKED (THE AMBASSADOR) HOW IT WOULD LOOK IF GROMYKO
WOULD LEAVE FOR CAIRO AND FOUR HOURS AFTER HE HAD LEFT THE
EGYPTIANS WOULD OPEN FIRE. WHO WOULD BELIEVE THAT THE
RUSSIANS WEREN'T INVOLVED?

10. THEN DR KISSINGER WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT ISRAEL'S
VULNERABILITY IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF THE OIL CRISIS, SUPPORT
FOR ISRAEL IN THE US CONGRESS WAS DWINDLING VISIBLY. HE HAD
HAD GREAT TROUBLE WHEN HE TRIED TO SECURE THE 2.2. BILLION
DOLLARS OF AID FOR ISRAEL. THE CONGRESS COMMITTEE WANTED
TO CUT THE AMOUNT BY 500 MILLION. HE MANAGED TO PREVENT THIS
ONLY BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US HAD ALREADY COMMITTED ITSELF
TO THE FULL AMOUNT AND THAT THE ARMS HAD ALREADY BEEN
EXPENDED IN THE WAR. IF CONGRESS WOULD CUT THE ALLOCATION,

THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR THE 500 MILLION UNDER ANOTHER BUDGET HEADING AND THEN THE ARABS WOULD REGARD THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00984 02 OF 04 201442Z

NEW REQUEST AS A FURTHER HOSTILE STEP.

11. KISSINGER BELIEVED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD CONTINUE TO DO DAMAGE IN THE HOPE OF GETTING A Foothold IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THAT WAS WHY HE INSISTED ON NOT BRINGING THEM IN ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE. THE ONLY COUNTRY APART FROM THE UNITED STATES WHICH HE DEFINED AS SUPPORTING ISRAEL "WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS" WAS IRAN.

12. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' EFFORTS TO APPEASE THE ARABS DEPRIVED THEM OF A CHANCE OF EXERTING INFLUENCE IN THE MID EAST. IN DR KISSINGER'S OPINION, THE ARABS NO LONGER RESPECTED EUROPE, WHILE THEY TREATED THE US WITH RESPECT FOR ITS OPEN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. JAPAN WAS ALSO BEHAVING STUPIDLY. IT HAD OFFERED KING FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA A BILLION DOLLARS WHILE HE NEITHER NEEDS NOR WANTS MONEY. JAPAN WOULD NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING IN SPITE OF WHAT IT DID.

13. THE OIL CRISIS WOULD BECOME MORE SEVERE IN THE US IN THE COMING MONTHS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO REDUCE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, THE SECRETARY BELIEVED.

14. IN THE YEARS 1971-1972 HUSSEIN WAS PREPARED TO SIGN A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND EVEN HAD TOLD HIM SO. HE ALSO SAID THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THE EGYPTIANS SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO ENTER INTO REAL NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER THEY EXPELLED THE RUSSIANS, THEY EXPECTED A GESTURE ON THE PART OF THE US AND ISRAEL. HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR HAVING BEEN SO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF VIET-NAM, THAT HE HAD NOT PRESSED ISRAEL TO ACT.

15. REVIEWING THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID THERE WERE FIVE SUBJECTS: BORDERS; SECURITY (DEMILITARIZED BUFFER ZONES); GUARANTEES; THE PALESTINIANS; JERUSALEM.

16. IN HIS OPINION IT WAS NOT WISE TO TRY AND SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN ONE GO AND PROMISES ABOUT ULTIMATE TARGETS SUCH AS DE JURE RECOGNITION COULD NOT PREVENT WAR, AS WITNESS INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00984 03 OF 04 201437Z

43

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AID-20 MC-02 DRC-01 AF-10

EUR-25 OMB-01 SAB-01 EB-11 FEA-02 SCI-06 /204 W

----- 103378

R 201114Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1574

UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 4 TEL AVIV 0984

17. THE SUBJECTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ONE BY ONE. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO BE TRIED FOR AT GENEVA WERE LARGE BUFFER ZONES BETWEEN THE ARMIES, AND AS OPTIMUM TARGET THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ENTIRE SINAI PENINSULA, FROM WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW. HISTORY, HE SAID, TAUGHT THAT THE SIDE THAT HOLDS SINAI PROVES TO BE THE INFERIOR ONE FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT. A DEMILITARIZED SINAI MEANT THAT AN ARMY ENTERING IT WOULD BE A CASUS BALLI. ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT, BUT MOST OF IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DEMILITARIZED. IN A MISSILE WAR, BORDERS, OR EVEN AREAS, PROVIDED NO DEFENSE.

18. AFTER THESE WITHDRAWALS AND AFTER AGREEMENT ON THEM WAS REACHED, OTHER SUBJECTS COULD BE APPROACHED. THE WITHDRAWAL AND DEMILITARIZATION SHOULD BE SETTLED AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY WITHIN TWO TO FOUR MONTHS, AT MOST A YEAR. OTHERWISE, THERE MIGHT BE ANOTHER WAR, WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY LIMITED US SUPPORT.

19. KISSINGER SAID HE WAS AGAINST THE IDEA OF A SECURITY TREATY WITH AMERICAN GUARANTEES. HE DID NOT SEE ANY SUBSTITUTE FOR AGREED BORDERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00984 03 OF 04 201437Z

20. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE SOLVED NOW. "THEY NEED TO BE FAR HUNGRIER THAN THEY ARE"

BEFORE THEY WOULD AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT AND TO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S STATUS.

21. THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM SHOULD ALSO BE LEFT TO THE END.

22. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT CANNOT AFFORD TO CAUSE DELAYS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT COULD NOT HOPE FOR ANY CHANGE TO ITS ADVANTAGE IN THE MEANTIME. THE ARABS HAD WON MORE THAN THEY IMAGINED. THEY WERE STILL AFRAID OF ISRAEL, BUT IF ISRAEL DID NOT START WITHDRAWING FAST, THERE WAS EVERY CHANCE THAT THE WAR WOULD START AGAIN WITH THE POSSIBLE RESULT OF TOTAL DISASTER. AT THE SAME TIME HE STRESSED, THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW TO THE BORDER OF 1967 AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE BORDER ON WHICH AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE BETTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE STRESSED AGAIN THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REFUSE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE DEMILITARIZED AND BECOME BUFFER ZONES.

23. KISSINGER DECLARED AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS EXPOSE, AND REPEATED IT SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THAT US HAD NOT REACHED ADVANCE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS OR THE ARABS ON THE COURSE OR THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THE NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA WOULD HAVE "TO WRITE THEIR OWN SCRIPT." HE DID NOT AGREE WITH PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPT AND THE WHITE HOUSE WHO WANTED TO OUTLINE A STRATEGY OF OVER-ALL AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE.

24. ISRAEL'S PUBLIC IMAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE RIGID, BUT WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVT-- KISSINGER THOUGHT-- THERE SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE NEED TO BE READY TO GIVE UP LARGE AREAS. HOWEVER, SUCH A CONCESSION MUST ON NO ACCOUNT SEEM TO BE MADE OUT OF WEAKNESS, FEAR OR NERVOUSNESS, BUT WOULD HAVE TO COME AS THE NATURAL RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

25. KISSINGER SHOWED HIMSELF VERY SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THAT THE OLDER UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00984 03 OF 04 201437Z

GENERATION, WHO HAD COME TO ISRAEL, DRAINED ITS MARSHES AND BUILT A NEW SOCIETY AND THE STATE, HAD AGAIN AND AGAIN EXPERIENCED SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF SUPERIOR FORCES. NOW, SUDDENLY, THEY FOUND THEMSELVES AGAIN IN A POSITION WHICH THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD ABANDONED FOR GOOD: THE POSITION OF A WEAK JEWISH COMMUNITY FACING A STRONG, HOSTILE WORLD. THIS GROUP, HE THOUGHT, WOULD FIND IT HARDER THAN ANYONE ELSE TO ADJUST TO THE NEW SITUATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00984 04 OF 04 201429Z

42

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AID-20 MC-02 DRC-01 AF-10

EUR-25 OMB-01 SAB-01 EB-11 FEA-02 SCI-06 /204 W

----- 103259

R 201114Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1575

UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 4 TEL AVIV 0984

26. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE AFRAID THAT THE FACT THAT HE WAS A JEW MIGHT BE A SORT OF WEAKNESS FOR THEM, THAT IT WOULD AFFECT HIS BEHAVIOR BY MAKING HIM LEAN OVER TOWARDS THE ARABS. TO THIS HE REPLIED THAT HE COULD, OF COURSE, NOT ANALYZE ALL HIS (UNCONSCIOUS) MOTIVES BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT HIS "RELIGION" WOULD WEAKEN HIS SUPORT FOR ISRAEL.

27. EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE HARDER IN THE FUTURE TO OBTAIN AMERICAN AID FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY ANOTHER AIR LIFT,

KISSINGER SAID, THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WOULD BACK ISRAEL. WHEN PRESSED TO SAY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE WAR WAS RESUMED, HE ANSWERED HE WOULD ADOPT THE IDENTICAL POSITION HE HAD ADOPTED IN OCTOBER, NAMELY, THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE GIVEN ALL THE ARMS AND HARDWARE IT NEEDED. (HE SEEMED TO TAKE CREDIT FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF THE OCTOBER DECISION TO SEND ARMS TO ISRAEL BY AIR.) HE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE ODDS WERE TWO TO ONE THAT HE WOULD SUCCEED (IN SECURING URGENT MILITARY AID FOR ISRAEL, BUT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE IT, BECAUSE RESISTANCE IN CONGRESS AND AMONG THE "BUREAUCRACY" TO ANOTHER AIR LIFT WOULD BE GREATER THAN IN THE PAST.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00984 04 OF 04 201429Z

28. ONE REASON WHY THERE WAS NO TIME FOR LONG NEGOTIATIONS AND WHY ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT FAST WAS, IN HIS OPINION, THAT PEACE WAS NOT IN THE ARABS' INTERESTS. THEY COULD ONLY GAIN FROM ANOTHER WAR. AT THE MOMENT, THOUGH, MANY OF THEM WERE NOT SURE OF THAT. THEY WERE STILL AFRAID OF WHAT ISRAEL COULD DO ON THE BATTLEFIELD, AND ALSO THEY WANTED TO GET RID OF THE RUSSIANS. US INTELLIGENCE HAD REPORTED THAT IN EGYPT, SYRIA AND ALGERIA, THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE LUKEWARM IN THEIR SUPPORT. THEREFORE THERE WAS STILL A REASONABLE CHANCE OF A FAIR BORDER SETTLEMENT IN THE COMING MONTHS.

29. KISSINGER EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WIND UP THE BORDER QUESTION AND WITHDRAW BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS WOUND UP OR EVEN STARTED TO BE DISCUSSED. THE SAME APPLIED TO DE JUR RECOGNITION. ISRAEL HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN THE PAST IN INSISTING ON NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD SOLVE ALL THE QUESTIONS AT ONCE: IT COULD NOT PERMIT ITSELF TO MAINTAIN THE SAME POSITION NOW IT WAS SO MUCH WEAKER.

30. HE BELIEVED THAT IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED AFTER THE WAR OF 1967 UNDER WHICH ISRAEL WOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT CONSIDERABLE WITHDRAWALS AND THE TERRITORIES WOULD HAVE BEEN DEMILITARIZED, THE ARABS WOULD HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO START A WAR BY PUSHING TANKS INTO A DEMILITARIZED ZONE WHICH THEY OWNED.

31. FOR SADAT AND FOR ALL EGYPTIANS, OCCUPIED SINAI WAS A VERY MEANINGFUL FACTOR. KISSINGER-- ACCORDING TO THE REPORT-- CLAIMED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD TOLD THE US SO, AND ALSO ISRAEL, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS FOR YEARS, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON LESS THAN THE BORDERS OF 1967.

32. HIS LONG-RANGE TARGET WAS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE MID EAST FOR ANOTHER TEN YEARS. BY THEN, A GREAT DEAL WOULD HAVE CHANGED, SUCH AS THE OIL FACTOR AND PERHAPS ALSO THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF "TRUE PEACE." ONE MUST TRY FOR THE BEST THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED, FOR ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF THE WAR. END EXCEPRTS.

KEATING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00984 04 OF 04 201429Z

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, REFUGEES, MILITARY OCCUPIED AREAS, PEACE PLANS, SPEECHES, CENTRAL LEGISLATURE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974TELAV00984
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740219/aaaaaslw.tel
Line Count: 438
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 FEB 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 FEB 2002 by elbezefj>; APPROVED <02 DEC 2002 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 6, 1973, MEETING WITH US JEWISH INTELLECTUALS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005